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THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S LIMITATION ON THE CLASS OF PLAINTIFFS
ALLOWED TO ASSERT VIOLATIONS OF THE
ALL HOLDERS RULE
Polaroid Corp. v. Disney,
862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988)
In Polaroid Corp. v. Disney,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit limited the class of plaintiffs that may assert violations
of the Securities and Exchange Commission's All Holders Rule2 to share-
holders, holding that a target corporation lacks third-party standing3 to
assert its shareholders' interests in enjoining a tender offer4 that excluded
1. 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988).
2. The All Holders Rule requires that a bidder hold open a tender offer to "all security holders
of the class of securities subject to the tender offer." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(1987). The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated the Rule to ensure "fair and equal treatment of all
holders of the class of securities that is the subject of the tender offer." Amendments to Tender Offer
Rules: All-Holders and Best-Price, 51 Fed.Reg. 25,873, 25,874 (1986). The Commission promul-
gated the All Holders Rule pursuant to Section 14(e) of the Williams Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e)(1988). Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968. The Act amended the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(e). R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 547
(1986). The Williams Act amendments impose disclosure requirements on acquisitions of stock
through both market purchases and tender offers. Id. The Polaroid dissent read Schreiber v. Bur-
lington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985), which characterized all of the Williams Act provisions as
disclosure provisions, to mean that the All Holders Rule promulgated pursuant to the Williams Act
is also a disclosure provision. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1008 n. 4. The majority rejected this argument
for allowing third-party standing under both the Williams Act and the All Holders Rule. Id. at 994-
95. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
Neither the Williams Act nor the All Holders Rule provides an express private right of action to
supplement the SEC's enforcement powers. Id. at 993. The Court, however, recognized an implied
private cause of action under the All Holders Rule in favor of the corporation's shareholders. Id. at
993-97. See also Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 946 (2d Cir.1988) (shareholders have right of action
under section 14(d)(7)); Pryor v. United States Steel Corp., 794 F.2d 52, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1986) (share-
holders have a right of action under section 14(d)(6)).
3. Standing is a jurisdictional concept which requires that a party have a sufficient stake in a
dispute to ensure that a justiciable controversy is presented to a court. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1260 (5th ed. 1979). Third-party, orjus tertii, standing refers to a plaintiff's standing to assert the
legal rights of a third party. In Polaroid, the Third Circuit addressed for the first time the issue
whether a target corporation has standing to assert a violation of the All Holders Rule on behalf of
its shareholders. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 989 (3d Cir. 1988). For further discussion of third-party
standing, see generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 3531.9 (1984); Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1984); Sedler,
The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1308 (1982).
4. In a tender offer, the offeror solicits the shareholders of a target company to tender their
shares for sale at a specified price. The offeror may offer cash, securities, or both as consideration for
the shares. The cash price offered usually exceeds the current market price by a substantial pre-
mium. Often the tender offeror structures its offer so that it is obligated to buy the tendered shares
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certain shareholders. The court, however, sanctioned the target corpora-
tion's third-party standing to enjoin a tender offeror's misrepresentations
under section 14(e)5 of the Williams Act.6
In Polaroid, Shamrock Acquisitions III, Inc. (Shamrock) made a cash
tender offer for all outstanding shares of Polaroid Corporation (Polaroid)
common stock, except those shares held by Polaroid's Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (ESOP).7 Shamrock expressly conditioned its tender of-
fer on a final judicial determination, or Shamrock's satisfaction, that the
ESOP shares were not validly outstanding.' Polaroid sought a prelimi-
nary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware, claiming that Shamrock violated the All Holders Rule by ex-
cluding the Polaroid ESOP shares from its tender offer.9 Polaroid fur-
ther claimed that certain disclosures by Shamrock violated section 14(e)
only if certain conditions are met. Tender offers are regulated primarily by sections 14(d) and (e) of
the Williams Act. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 531-33 (1986). See supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or
in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
Id.
6. The court based this holding on two previous Third Circuit decisions in which the court
recognized the right without explanation. See City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco
Inc., 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974).
The Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
its holding that Polaroid presented a reasonable probability of success on the merits of its § 14(e)
claim. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1003-04.
7. Through a number of shell organizations, Shamrock is controlled by Roy and Patricia Dis-
ney. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 990.
8. Id. Shamrock's offer required tender of at least 90 percent of Polaroid's outstanding com-
mon shares, excluding the ESOP shares. In addition, Shamrock expressly conditioned its tender
offer on the invalidation or recission of the ESOP stock. Id. The offer further provided that should
the ESOP condition fail prior to the expiration of the offer, Shamrock could amend the offer so as to:
(1) Waive the ESOP condition; (2) reduce the tender offer price; and (3) adjust the number of shares
required to account for the ESOP shares. Id. Prior to Polaroid's suit, Shamrock filed suit against
Polaroid in the Delaware Chancery Court, seeking to invalidate the ESOP shares. Id. Shamrock
alleged that the Polaroid board adopted the ESOP in violation of its fiduciary duties, entrenching
incumbent management, and responding unreasonably to Shamrock's interest in acquiring Polaroid
on a friendly basis. Id. The Third Circuit ruled on the instant action prior to the completion of
Shamrock's suit. Id.
9. Id. at 990. See supra note 2. The Polaroid ESOP held 9.7 million shares of Polaroid com-
mon stock. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 992.
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of the Williams Act." The district court denied Polaroid injunctive re-
lief on both claims, refusing to find a violation of the All Holders Rule or
section 14(e).I 1 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's refusal to enjoin the tender offer under Polaroid's All
Holders Rule claim, vacated the district court's order involving the sec-
tion 14(e) claim, and held: the All Holders Rule creates a private right of
action for shareholders;2 a target corporation does not have third-party
standing to assert an All Holders Rule violation 3 but does have standing
to sue under section 14(e)'s implied right of action to enjoin tender offer
misrepresentation. 14
In determining whether a target corporation may assert claims on be-
half of its shareholders, a court first must decide whether the corporation
possesses its own private right of action; if the corporation has no such
right, then it may assert its shareholders' claims only if it has third-party
standing. 5 In employing this methodology, the Third Circuit in Polaroid
focused on Supreme Court precedent dealing with implied private right
of action.1 6 The Third Circuit, however, applied the Supreme Court
implied private right of action decisions in the context of an agency
rule.' 7 The Polaroid court then proceeded to address whether, absent an
implied right of action in its own right, a target corporation may have
10. Id. at 990-91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)(1988). Polaroid claimed that Shamrock violated sec-
tion 14(e) by representing that its tender offer complied with Federal Reserve Board margin regula-
tions limiting the use of debt securities by shell corporations in financing corporate takeovers.
Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 990.
11. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 991. In reaching its decision, the district court "assumed... argu-
endo that Polaroid does have standing" to assert a violation of the All Holders Rule. Polaroid Corp.
v. Disney, 698 F. Supp. 1169, 1174 (D. Del. 1988). The district court, however, found no violation
of the Rule. Id. at 1174-75. It reasoned that Shamrock should not be forced to extend its tender
offer to holders of Polaroid ESOP shares while Shamrock was challenging the validity of those
shares in another action. Id. at 1174. Polaroid appealed and moved for an injunction pending ap-
peal. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 991.
12. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 997. See infra notes 19-41 and accompanying text.
13. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1001-02. The Polaroid court used '"us tertii doctrine" and third-party
standing interchangeably. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 990, 1003.
15. See id. at 993.
16. See infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text. The doctrine of implied private right of
action originated in an early Supreme Court case, Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916). The Rigsby Court held that when a member of a class for whose "especial benefit" a statute
was enacted is injured by a violation of that statute, that class member has an implied right to
recover damages. Id. at 39. For further discussion of implied rights of action, see generally Schnei-
der, Implying Federal Rights & Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C.L. REV. 853
(1984).
17. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 993-97. The court viewed the implied private cause of action cases as
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third-party standing to assert its shareholders' implied private right of
action under an agency rule.18
In J I Case Co. v. Borak 19 the Supreme Court first recognized a
shareholder's private right of action, which involved a violation of sec-
tion 14(a)20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.21 In Borak, a stock-
holder brought suit against the corporation in which he owned shares,
seeking rescission of, or damages caused by, a consummated merger be-
tween his corporation and another.22 The stockholder alleged that the
corporation violated section 14(a) by using a false and misleading proxy
statement.23 The Court concluded that the primary purpose of section
14(a) is to protect shareholders24 and established a private right of action
on behalf of shareholders to effectuate the statute's purpose.25
In Cort v. Ash,26 the Supreme Court refined its approach to recogniz-
ing an implied private right of action. Faced with a shareholder at-
tempting to sue the corporation for violation of a federal criminal
a logical starting point because "[if a private right of action exists in favor of a party, standing
follows as a matter of course." Id. at 993. See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
18. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 997-1002. See infra notes 44-53, 64-83 and accompanying text. In its
third party standing analysis, the Third Circuit examined cases in which the Supreme Court allowed
a plaintiff to assert, in limited circumstances, the rights of a third party when a statute expressly
created a cause of action in favor of the third party. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 993.
19. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
20. Section 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or other-
wise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit
or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section [12] of this
title.
Id.
21. Borak, 377 U.S. at 431.
22. Id. at 427.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 432.
25. Id. The Court in Borak emphasized that private enforcement of the section 14(a) proxy
rules would supplement SEC action. Specifically, the Court observed that the threat of civil damages
or injunctive relief "serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements."
Id. at 432. In the wake of Borak's expansion of judicially implied private causes of action, the
Supreme Court, in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), found
that a private cause of action existed under section 10 of the 1934 Securities Act and Rule lob-5.
The Court summarily accepted the lower court's recognition of this right without elaboration or
discussion, reducing its treatment of the question to a footnote. Id. at 13 n. 9. With such deference,
Bankers Life represents the most liberal example of the Supreme Court's practice of implying causes
of action in federal statutes.
26. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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statute,27 the Supreme Court in Cort created a four-factor test to deter-
mine whether a court may infer a private remedy from a federal statute.28
The four factors were: (1) whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"; 29 (2) any explicit or im-
plicit indication of legislative intent to create or deny a private cause of
action; (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the
statute to find an implied private cause of action; and (4) whether the
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state courts such that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based on federal law.30
The Court held that the statute provided no implied right of action to the
shareholder.31
Applying Cort's four-factor analysis, the Supreme Court in Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries3 2 held that an implied private right of action for
damages is not available to an unsuccessful tender offeror under section
14(e) of the Williams Act. 3   Based on the legislative history of section
14(e), the Chris-Craft Court concluded that the sole purpose of the sec-
tion is to protect investors confronted with a tender offer.34 According to
the Court, Congress chose to regulate tender offerors in order to protect
target corporation shareholders.3 The Court reasoned that because
tender offerors are not members of the class for whose "especial" benefit
section 14(e) was enacted, the first Cort factor36 necessary for judicial
27. In Cart, a shareholder sought an injunction and damages against the corporation in which
he owned shares, alleging violations of the Federal Elections Campaign Act. The Federal Election
Campaign Act is a criminal statute prohibiting corporate expenditures in campaigns for federal of-
fice. Cart, 422 U.S. at 71. The Court addressed the issue whether a private cause of action for
damages may be implied in favor of a corporate stockholder under a federal statute not expressly
providing such a right.
28. Id. at 78. The Polaroid court cited Cart as the leading case on determination of implied
private rights of action. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 997 n.6.
29. Cart, 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916))
(emphasis in the Cart opinion).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 84-85.
32. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
33. Id. at 42. In Chris-Craft, an unsuccessful tender offeror brought suit against the successful
bidder for control of the target corporation, alleging, among other things, violations of section 14(e).
The Supreme Court in Chris-Craft emphasized the limited nature of its holding: "Whether share-
holder-offerees, the class protected by § 14(e), have an implied cause of action under § 14(e) is not
before us.... Nor is the target corporation's standing to sue in issue in this case." Id. at 42, n.28.
34. Id. at 35 (citing legislative history).
35. Id. at 28.
36. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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recognition of an implied private right of action remained unsatisfied.37
Moreover, the Court concluded that none of the remaining Cort factors
supported the finding of an implied right of action in favor of the party
that the statute at issue regulated.38
A related question arises when a court decides whether an implied
cause of action exists under an agency rule. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed this issue in Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities,
Inc.,39 in which it developed a three-part analysis: (1) whether the un-
derlying enabling statute allowed implication of a private cause of ac-
tion;' (2) whether the agency rule was properly within the scope of the
enabling statute;41 and (3) whether inferring a private cause of action
would further the enabling statute's purpose.42 The second and third
parts of the inquiry apply the Cort statutory analysis to agency rules.43
37. Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 37.
38. Id. at 38-40. Regarding the second Cort factor, the Court in Chris-Craft found no indica-
tion that Congress intended either to create or to deny an implied right of action in favor of tender
offerors. Id. at 38. The Court concluded, nevertheless, that Congress did not intend to provide
tender offerors with "additional weapons" in contests for control. Id. Addressing the third Cort
factor, the Court determined that because the Williams Act is primarily a disclosure mechanism
aimed at the protection of shareholders, the act cannot, consistent with this purpose, be interpreted
to confer a monetary remedy upon one of the regulated parties. Id. at 39. Finally, the Court con-
cluded that a tender offeror's cause of action for damages from loss of an opportunity to control a
corporation is more appropriately relegated to state law. Id. at 40-41. See supra notes 33-36 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of Chris-Craft, see Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Wil-
liams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117 (1978).
The Supreme Court reiterated the Cort analysis in subsequent decisions, addressing the issue of
whether Congress intended to 6reate a private cause of action under a federal statute. See e.g.,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (legislative history of Com-
modity Exchange Act allowed Court to infer a private right of action under act's provisions); Mid-
dlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (Federal Water
Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 evidenced
no congressional intent implicitly to authorize additional juidicial remedies for private citizens).
39. 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985). The Angelastro court specifically answered the question
whether an implied private cause of action exists under Rule lOb-16 of the 1934 Securities and
Exchange Act. Id. at 941.
40. Id. at 947. The court was able to rely on well-established Supreme Court precedent to show
that Rule lOb-16's enabling statute allowed implied private causes of action. Id. at 948 (citing Su-
perintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)).
41. Id. at 947. The court found that the rule fell within the agency's grant of authority. Id. at
949.
42. Id. at 947. The Third Circuit found the added enforcement inherent in a private cause of
action conformed to Congress' purpose behind the enabling statute. Id. at 949-50.
43. While the Angelastro opinion does not refer to Cort-likely because of the accepted status of
implied causes of action under the enabling statute-one might assume that part one of Angelastro's
analysis invokes the Cort test for finding an implied cause of action.
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If a party does not have an implied right of action under a particular
statute or rule, she may have third-party, or jus tertii, standing' to sue
on behalf of a party that does possess such an implied right of action."
Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized third-party standing
with considerable reluctance, requiring that a plaintiff assert his own
legal rights without resting his claim on the rights of a third party. In
Warth v. Seldin,46 several parties sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against a town, claiming a local zoning ordinance unconstitutionally ex-
cluded low- and moderate-income individuals from living in the commu-
nity.47 The Court held that a plaintiff may assert the rights of a third
party if "countervailing considerations" outweigh judicial reluctance to
allow one party to assert the claims of another.48
One context in which the Supreme Court recognizes third-party stand-
ing involves an association asserting a legal claim on behalf of its mem-
bers.49 The Court laid the groundwork for the associational standing
doctrine in NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson by holding that an asso-
44. See supra note 3.
45. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
46. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
47. Id. at 495. The plaintiffs were apparently asserting the rights of third parties under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id.
48. Id. at 500-01. The Warth Court failed to elaborate on the "countervailing considerations"
required to overcome the judicial reluctance to allow plaintiffs to assert the rights of third parties.
But the Court did delineate factors necessary to consider in determining whether a litigant is entitled
to have a court decide the merits of his case. Id. at 498. Specifically, the Court noted that the issue
of standing involves both constitutional, case-and-controversy limitations on a federal court's juris-
diction and the court's own circumspection in exercising its jurisdiction. Both these considerations,
the Court asserted, are founded on the "concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of
the courts in a democratic society." Id.
In addition to the Article III threshold case-and-controversy requirement, the standing issue also
involves prudential rules that limit the role of courts in solving disputes. Id. at 500. Within the
bounds of these limitations, the standing question asks whether the statute upon which the plaintiff's
claim rests properly grants the plaintiff a right to judicial relief. Id. See also Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
49. See Sierrra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (the associational standing doctrine reflects
the general principle that an organization may represent its injured members' legal interests in judi-
cial proceedings. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has allowed trade associations, public interest
groups and other such associations to assert the legal claims of their members. Japan Whaling Ass'n
v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230-31 n.4 (1986) (Administrative Procedure Act did not
prevent third-party implied private right of action under the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's
Protective Act); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) (third-party
standing could obtain if Article III injury requirement could be proven on behalf of organization
members); National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246, 247 (1963) (per
curiam) (Association of Motor Carriers granted standing under 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) to assert claims for
its members).
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ciation may have standing to assert the legal claims of its members even
absent injury to itself"
The Supreme Court expanded third-party associational standing in
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission."' The Hunt
Court held that an entity's status as a state agency, rather than a tradi-
tional voluntary membership association, did not preclude it from assert-
ing the rights of its constituents.5 2 The Court held that an association
has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (1) its mem-
bers would otherwise have standing in their own right; (2) the interests
the association seeks to protect are "germane to the organization's pur-
pose"; and (3) neither the claim nor the relief requires the individual
members' participation in the lawsuit.53
In Polaroid Corp. v. Disney,54 the Third Circuit held that the All Hold-
ers Rule,55 promulgated pursuant to the Williams Act, 6 creates an im-
plied private right of action for shareholders.57 The court, however,
refused to recognize either a target corporation's implied cause of action
or third-party standing to assert an All Holders Rule claim on behalf of
its shareholders.58
In recognizing an implied right of action for shareholders under the
50. 357 U.S. 449, 458-61 (1958) (organization can assert first amendment rights of its mem-
bers). See generally Monaghan, supra note 3, at 288. The Court in Warth v. Seldin decided that, to
assert its member's legal rights under the associational standing doctrine, the association must allege
that its members suffered or might suffer some injury, sufficient to "make out a justiciable case had
the members themselves brought suit." 422 U.S. at 511.
51. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). In Hunt, a state agency responsible for the promotion and protection
of the Washington state apple industry challenged the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute
prohibiting the display of Washington state apple grades on apples shipped into North Carolina. Id.
at 335. The District Court granted injunctive relief, recognizing the Commission's standing to chal-
lenge the statute on behalf of the Washington apple growers. Id. at 339-40.
52. Id. at 344.
53. Id. at 343. In decisions subsequent to Hunt, the Supreme Court has hesitated to expand
third-party standing. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (recognizing limits on the exercise of
federal jurisdiction in the context of third-party standing); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study,
438 U.S. 59, 78 (1978) (recognizing a plaintiff's third-party standing to assert the unconstitutionality
of the Price-Anderson Act but enumerating several limitations on the doctrine).
54. 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988).
55. See supra note 2.
56. See id.
57. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 996-97.
58. Id. at 1001-02. The court summarily declared that it could find no evidence that the All
Holders Rule creates a private right of action for the target corporation. Id. at 997. In reaching this
conclusion, the court determined that Polaroid was not " 'one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statue was enacted.'" Id. at 997 (citing Cort v. Ash. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (quoting Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916))).
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All Holders Rule, the Polaroid court concluded both that the SEC acted
within its authority in promulgating the rule and that the rule is properly
within the scope of the Williams Act.59 Additionally, Congress intended
courts to infer private rights of action to facilitate enforcement of the
act.' The Polaroid court reasoned that an implied private right of action
under the All Holders Rule would further the Williams Act's purpose of
protecting shareholders from irreparable harm through injunctive relief
and compensating injured shareholders through damages." The Third
Circuit decided, nevertheless, that because the Williams Act was enacted
for the "especial benefit" 62 of shareholders, no evidence existed that the
All Holders Rule also creates a private right of action on behalf of the
target corporation.63
In addressing whether a target corporation has third-party standing
under the All Holders Rule,' the Third Circuit first concluded that a
target corporation meets constitutional standing requirements. 65 The
court then applied third-party associational standing analysis.66 The
59. Id. at 994-95.
60. Id. at 995. The Third Ciruit considered it "reasonable to conclude that Congress passed the
Williams Act with an understanding that courts would construe the Act as creating private reme-
dies," because of Borak and other courts' construction of Rule lOb-5. Id. at 996. See supra notes 19-
25 and accompanying text.
61. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 997.
62. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
63. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 997.
64. Having found no implied right of action in favor of the target corporation, the Third Circuit
addressed whether the plaintiff could sue as a third party. At the outset of this inquiry, the court
found that, because Polaroid premised its claim on the violation of a rule promulgated pursuant to a
Williams Act provision, and because Congress intended that the act protect shareholders, Polaroid
necessarily sought to vindicate the rights of its shareholders rather than its own. Id. at 998. Thus,
the court turned to third-party standing analysis.
65. Id. at 997. Quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Third Circuit emphasized
that a litigant must "allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief" in order to meet the constitutional facet
of the standing requirement. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 997. Polaroid easily met this requirement, as the
court found it evident that a successful Shamrock tender offer would injure Polaroid. Id.
66. Id. at 997. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. The Polaroid majority, while
applying associational standing doctrine, refused to apply a second strand of third-party standing
decisions, exemplified by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) and Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106
(1976). In that line of cases, the Supreme Court granted sellers of products or services the right to
sue on behalf of purchasers when the restriction involved might interfere with the purchasers' rights.
For example, in Craig, vendors were permitted to sue on behalf of male vendees between the ages of
18-20 who, unlike their female counterparts, were not allowed to purchase 3.2% beer. Craig, 429
U.S. at 195-97. The Polaroid court distinguished these cases on the ground that they involved inter-
ference with the plaintiff-third party relationships, whereas Polaroid could allege no interference in
its dealings with its shareholders. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1000 n.8.
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court identified factors that would weigh in favor of granting Polaroid
standing to assert the rights of its shareholders. 67 Specifically, sharehold-
ers would benefit from Polaroid's third-party standing because, while the
cost of litigation is often prohibitive to individual shareholders, the target
corporation usually possesses the necessary resources.68 Furthermore,
allowing target corporations to assert violations of the All Holders Rule
might result in increased enforcement of the securities laws. 69
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that other considerations
outweighed any salutary effect that might result from allowing a target
corporation to assert violations of the All Holders Rule on behalf of its
shareholders.70 The court observed that potential conflicts of interest
weighed against allowing a target corporation third-party standing to
vindicate shareholder rights under the Rule.7" First, the court envi-
sioned a conflict arising between shareholders who would collect a pre-
mium from the tender offer and those who were excluded from the
offer.72 The court reasoned that the corporation would probably be more
inclined to protect the majority, thus undercutting the policy of third-
party standing for the minority.7"
Second, the court identified a potential conflict between shareholders
of the target corporation and its management, which, according to the
court, "ha[s] a natural incentive to resist a corporate takeover. '' 74 The
court concluded that it would disallow associational standing when the
67. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 998.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 997. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
71. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 998-99.
72. Id. at 999.
73. Id. The court asserted that, because of this conflict, the target corporation would not be an
aggressive advocate of all shareholders' rights. Id.
74. Id. at 999-1000. The court noted that even shareholders injured by their exclusion from the
tender offer "profit handsomely" from it and actually may be injured by litigation that would defeat
the offer. Id. at 999. The Polaroid court supported this conclusion by pointing out that the market
price of a corporation's stock usually increases soon after a tender offer is made. Id. Shareholders
can thus profit from the tender offer by selling their shares to the offeror at the tender offer premium
price or to third parties at the increased market price. Unless top corporate officers are protected by
an anti-takeover provision guaranteeing them compensation upon dismissal, they stand to suffer a
great loss of earnings if the takeover is successful. Id. at 1000 (citing Unocal Corp. v, Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)). See also Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982)
(describing welfare and incentive effects of corporate takeovers). See generally E. HERMAN, CORPO-
RATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role ofa Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Lowenstein, Pruning
Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1983).
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potential for serious conflicts of interest exists among the members of an
association or between an association and its members.75 Thus, because
Polaroid failed to meet the Hunt criteria,7 6 it could not assert the rights
of its shareholders.77
The court rejected Polaroid's contention that allowing target corpora-
tions standing to assert violations of the All Holders Rule would result in
increased enforcement of the securities laws.78 The court observed that
Polaroid failed to consider the level of enforcement that Congress con-
templated and the impact of allowing third-party standing on the con-
gressional decision to entrust enforcement of the securities laws to the
SEC.79  Furthermore, Polaroid's position failed to take into account
other policy considerations such as balancing the costs of private litiga-
tion to both the parties and the court system with the benefits gained
from expanding third-party standing.80
The Polaroid court next defended its implicit distinction between
third-party standing to assert All Holders Rule violations and standing
to assert section 14(e) misrepresentation violations.8" First, the court as-
serted that the section 14(e) bar against misrepresentation protects all
shareholders while the All Holders Rule is likely to protect only a minor-
ity of shareholders.8 2 Second, the court reasoned that a target corpora-
tion's standing is necessary under section 14(e) because of the difficulty in
detecting misrepresentations and the irreparability of the harm caused by
such violations.
83
Judge Cowen, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's refusal to grant
Polaroid third-party standing to assert violations of the All Holders
75. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999.
76. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
77. Polariod, 862 F.2d at 1001-02. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. Implicit in
the Polaroid court's holding is the basic premise that claims brought under the All Holders Rule
require the individual shareholders' participation in the lawsuit.
78. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1000.
79. Id.
80. Id. For further discussion of the tender offer as a socially beneficial transaction, see gener-
ally R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 270-72 (1985); Frankel, Implied
Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 570-85 (1981); Stewart & Sanction, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1229-32 (1982).
81. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1001. Seesupra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Third Circuit cases holding that a target corporation has standing to raise § 14(e) claims.
82. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1001. The court reasoned that a target corporation litigating its
shareholders' rights makes "more sense" when the corporation is defending the rights of all its share-
holders. Id.
83. Id.
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Rule.84 First, he noted that ample precedent exists allowing a corpora-
tion third-party standing to sue under section 14(e).85 Second, Judge
Cowen reasoned that because the SEC promulgated the All Holders Rule
to enforce section 14(e), the majority's refusal similarly to recognize
third-party standing under the Rule illogically departs from this policy.8 6
Finally, the dissent asserted that both the Rule and section 14(e) were
driven by the purpose of disclosure to the shareholder.8 7
The Third Circuit, in its analysis of standing under the All Holders
Rule, followed Supreme Court precedent limiting judicially implied pri-
vate causes of action.88  The court, however, departed from sound logic
in accepting precedent granting a target corporation third-party standing
to assert violations of section 14(e), while denying the same corporation
third-party standing to assert violations of a rule promulgated pursuant
to section 14(e).89 Recognizing that the statute and the regulation have
the same underlying purpose90 accentuates this flaw.
The Third Circuit advances a weak argument in support of its deci-
sion.91 The court appears to rest its holding primarily on the possible
conflicts resulting from a corporation asserting All Holders Rule viola-
tions on behalf of its shareholders. 92 The first conflict envisioned by the
court lies between the majority shareholders, who view the offer as bene-
ficial, and the minority excluded from the offer. Because of this conflict
the court concludes that a corporation is "an uncertain representative" of
the interest of minority shareholders, as it may tend to protect only ma-
84. Id. at 1007 (Owen, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1008. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
86. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1008.
87. Id. n.4. The dissent relied on Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) for
its conclusion. See supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 19-42 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
91. In applying the Hunt test for associational third-party standing, the Third Circuit summa-
rily concludes that the interests a corporation would seek to protect in All Holders Rule litigation
are not "germane to the organization's purpose." Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999. Specificially, the court
states that the interest a corporation would be vindicating in All Holders Rule litigation is the right
of some shareholders to sell at a price equal to that of other shareholders to a third-party tender
offeror. Id. at 998. This interest, the court concludes, is different from that ordinarily pursued in
corporate litigation: protection of the corporation's business. Id. at 999. When one considers that,
in today's highly fluid market, corporate stock represents not only its business-profit value, but its
resale value as well, the contemporaneous duty of directors to protect shareholders from underval-
ued offers refutes the court's conclusion.
92. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999.
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jority interests.93 This argument does not support the court's holding,
however, for even if a corporation with standing does not sue, the minor-
ity shareholders themselves may assert All Holders Rule violations.94
The second conflict that the court hypothesized involves the share-
holders and the corporation's management95 : directors might use All
Holders Rule suits to forestall a merger offer actually in the shareholders'
interest, solely for the purpose of entrenchment. 96 Yet management mis-
conduct manifesting itself as attempted entrenchment is more properly
addressed in an action under state law.9 7 In light of the lack of strong
support for its holding, the court's approval of third-party standing for
corporations in the 14(e) context could easily and logically be extended
to the All Holders Rule. 98
Because of the lack of sound logic and principled rationale supporting
the Polaroid decision, it is unlikely that courts in other jurisdictions will
accept the Third Circuit's analysis as persuasive.
Deborah K. Rush
93. Id.
94. An alternative interpretation of the court's first concern is that it feared a corporate board
justifiably bringing an All Holders Rule action, but then not pressing the claim in good faith, thus
hurting the minority shareholders' chances of success. This argument, like the court's second con-
cern, represents a valid concern, but one which traditionally has been the subject of a state fiduciary
duty suit. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
95. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999-1000. The court notes that even shareholders excluded from the
tender offer can profit from the offer by selling their shares in the market at a premium after the
announcement of the offer. Id. at 999. On the other hand, the corporation's management often
resists tender offers because of the potential loss of future earnings. Id. at 1000.
96. Id. at 999-1000.
97. Such a move by managment would be clear breach of fiduciary duty, and thus fall squarely
under state corporation law.
98. Given the Third Circuit's approval of target corporations' standing under section 14(e), the
decision in Polaroid seems illogical. Though the court fears director abuse of an All Holders Rule
suit, it expresses no such concern over an equally disruptive section 14(e) suit.
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